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I. INTRODUCTION

As the civil war raged on, the Assad regime began to block food and
medical supplies from entering besieged Syrian villages.' Because many
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., International
Relations and Political Science, 2012, Lehigh University. I would like to thank Professor Margaret
Lewis for her invaluable guidance and thoughtful feedback on this Article. I would also like to
thank Professor Charles Sullivan and Michael Spizzuco for their editing assistance.
1. See Rep. of the Independent Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
U.N. Human Rights Council, 25th Sess., July 15, 2013-Jan. 15, 2014,
13, 132, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014) (outlining evidence of excessive use of force, torture, unlawful
121
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cannot leave these areas, starvation and death have resulted because of
the regime's effort to root out rebel forces. 2 News reports in October 2013
indicate that a Syrian state security official called it the "Starvation Until
Submission Campaign." 3 In August 2013, U.N. inspectors found clear
and convincing evidence that sarin gas was used in Ghouta, a Syrian
village near Damascus, which resulted in the death of civilians. 4 The rise
of extremist militants from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
created further unrest, especially in light of the group's seizure of military
bases along the Syria-Iraq border.5 In light of these events, all eyes are on
the Security Council to take action. As a Permanent Five (P5) member,
the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) exerted significant
influence over the Security Council's response, or lack thereof.
In light of the PRC's veto power and changing political agenda, it is a
key player within the Security Council. The situation in Syria is the latest
in a series of intrastate conflicts that have left the P5 slow to respond, in
large part, because of China's and Russia's 6 non-interventionist stance.
However, recent Chinese participation in U.N. peacekeeping has called
into question whether the PRC still adheres to its traditional foreign
policy centered upon a strict respect for state sovereignty and the noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.
As of 2011, China was the largest troop contributor to peacekeeping
missions of the P5 and the fifteenth largest troop contributor in the
world.7 Additionally, the Security Council has employed sanctions with
increasing frequency since the end of the Cold War; 8 thus, demonstrating
killing, and attacks on civilians) [hereinafter Int'l Comm'n Report on Syria]; Reports: Syria Using
Starvation as War Tactic, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 20, 2013, 09:25 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/middleeast/2013/10/reports-syria-using-starvation-as-war-tactic-2013103081531929448.

html.
2. See Int'l Comm'n Report on Syria, supra note 1.
3. See id. 13; see also Insight: Starvation in Syria: A War Tactic, REUTERS (Oct. 30,
2013, 04:27 EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/30/us-syria-crisis-hunger-insightidUSB RE99T07120131030.
4. See Int'l Comm'n Report on Syria, supra note 1,
127-129; see INT'L COAL. FOR THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, THE CRISIS INSYRIA, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.

php/crises/crisis-in-syria [hereinafter THE CRISIS IN SYRIA] (the International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect is an organization that advocates for normative consensus for the
responsibility to protect).
5. Ben Hubbard, ISIS Tightens Its Grip with Seizure of Air Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES,
(Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/world/middleeast/isis-militants-captureair-base-from-syrian-government-forces.html.
6.

See infra Part 111.

7. See Robert Weiss & Steven Hill, China as Peacekeeper: Implicationsfor the Law and
Politics ofHumanitarianIntervention, 6 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 137, 137 (2011).
8. See Enrico Carisch & Loraine Rickard-Martin, Global Threats and the Role of United
Nations Sanctions, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Int'l Policy Analysis, at 2 (2011) (discussing the
effectiveness of sanctions generally and the types of sanctions the Security Council may apply).
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the PRC's limited use of its veto power. This paradoxical relationship
between classic Chinese attitudes on foreign policy and increased
involvement in international organizations has raised questions regarding
Beijing's perceived change of heart.
China has become a big player in the international system. For
example, China is now "party to 571 conventions, 203 treaties, and 2,616
agreements." 9 China is a rising power with growing economic and
military strength. As it rises, China is becoming more cooperative in
international organizations, such as the United Nations, in order to boost
its international influence.' 0 Becoming more involved in international
organizations is one of the ways in which the PRC pursues its quest to
become a great power." 1
During the Clinton administration, the United States took an approach
of "constructive engagement" in an effort to incorporate China in
international institutions. 12 Scholars have argued that the goals
underlying the policy include strengthening the influence of international
institutions 13 and shaping China's behavior to conform to the Western
values 14 these institutions represent.' 5 The policy was altered during the
Bush administration when Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick
"called on China to become a 'responsible stakeholder' of the
international community.' 16 In that speech, Zoellick listed several
changes China must make to its regime and foreign policy in order to
17
become a responsible stakeholder.
It seems that the United States has gotten part of what it wished for;
China has become highly involved in international organizations 8 and,
in particular, the Security Council. The PRC has sought to project an
image of being a responsible power and ease any fears of China's growth
9. Julian G. Ku, China and the Future of InternationalAdjudication, 27 MD. J. INT'L L.
154, 161 (2012).
10. See, e.g., SusAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 11 (2008).
11. See, e.g., id. at 109 (the other two strategies China uses to maintain its growth are
accommodating its neighbors and using its strong economic ties to make friends).
12. See Weiss & Hill, supra note 7, at 138; Amitai Etzioni, Is China a Responsible
Stakeholder?, 87 INT'L AFF. 539, 540 (2011).
13. In an effort to bind state action by making it too costly for states to disregard these
institutions.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See, e.g., Weiss & Hill, supra note 7, at 138.
16. See Etzioni, supra note 12, at 540.
17. See id.
18. See Ku, supra note 9, at 154 (indicating that the PRC actively participates in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and has begun to accept compulsory jurisdiction for arbitration under
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)); see also Michael
Fullilove, China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum, 34 WASH. Q. 63, 66 (2011)
(explaining how the PRC has become highly involved in Asian institutions such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and the East Asia Summit).
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in economic and military strength. 19 In 1997, President Jiang Zemin
recognized that China requires a peaceful international environment to
support its development. 2° The term "peaceful rise" was coined by an
advisor to President Hu Jintao in 2003 to explain China's emergence on
the world scene and its desire to secure a stable environment conducive
to growth. 2' However, one question remains: does this new strategy of
active involvement in peacekeeping operations signal that China is
conforming to Western values? This Article answers in the negative.
China's values are changing in a more nuanced way. This Article argues
that Chinese values appear to be aligning more toward values
underpinning the United Nations and the Security Council as expressed
by the U.N. Charter, 22
which are similar in some ways to Western values
and distinct in others.
China behaves in conformance with self-interest, similar to many
other states in the international system, including the United States.
Deviations from the traditional Chinese policy of non-intervention with
a strict focus on state sovereignty can partly be explained by the balance
of power in the international system and China's growing interests
throughout the world. China is a rational player on the international scene
and will continue to so act in the future. Therefore, analyzing Chinese
values and material interests is important in understanding the PRC's
current decision-making in the Security Council and in what to anticipate
in the future.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II defines the relevant Western
values this Article refers to in the study and the values underlying the
United Nations and the Security Council. It will show that, although
Western values and U.N. values overlap, they also differ in several ways.
Part III briefly examines China's historical relationship with the United
Nations and the Security Council and the present period of increased
involvement. Part IV describes recent case studies and analyzes the
PRC's support, or lack thereof, for Security Council action. Part V
concludes with lessons learned from the analysis in the previous Part and
explores how states generally act out of self-interest. It also argues that,
based upon this foregoing analysis, China's values are not significantly
Westernizing and instead, seem to be moving more toward values
19.

See INTERNATIONAL CRIsIs GROUP, CHINA' S GROWING ROLE IN UN PEACEKEEPING, at

i

(Asia Rep. N. 166, 2009) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 2009]; see generally SIRK,

supra note 10, at 136.
20. See Etzioni, supra note 12, at 541.
21. See Council on Foreign Relations, Report of an Independent Task Force, US.-China
Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course 36 (2007); see generally SHIRK, supra
note 10, at 108. However, Chinese leaders now use "peaceful development" to explain China's
strategy to become a great power for fear that "peaceful rise" may be interpreted as threatening
which may trigger balancing coalitions against it.
22. See infra Part II.
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associated with the United Nations and the Security Council.
Furthermore, certain conditions must be present in order for the PRC to
support Security Council action in conflicts such as Syria. Finally, the
Part ends with what the PRC's new pragmatic approach means for the
Security Council moving forward.
II. RELEVANT

VALUES

23

Defining Western values is no easy task. No general consensus exists
among scholars about what "Western" truly refers to. For the purposes of
this Article, the West incorporates both the United States and Europe.
The relevant Western values this Article refers to include individualism,24
constitutionalism, democracy, free markets, and the promotion of human
rights. 25 Although China has increasingly embraced free markets and
human rights considerations in recent decades, this Article argues that it
is not undergoing a significant shift toward Western values.
The values underpinning the United Nations and the Security Council
are in some ways distinct from the Western values above and in other
ways similar. After World War II shocked the international system, the
United Nations was created in 1945 in an effort to prevent future military
conflict among Member States and to settle international disputes
peacefully. 26 The drafters of the U.N. Charter intended to create a system
of collective security to prevent future catastrophic war. 7 To serve that
goal, one of the foundational principles of the U.N. Charter is the general
prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). This provision was
intended to be comprehensive, outlawing not only traditional war, but
also other uses of physical force in armed conflict, save for particular
circumstances like humanitarian intervention and situations of selfdefense.28
In addition, the United Nations was founded upon the values of state
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of Member States.
According to the U.N. Charter, "[n]othing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which

23. A "value" is an underlying principle that informs state decision-making on a
fundamental level. This is different than an "interest" which is a material reason that influences
state behavior.
24. This refers to the focus on the individual versus any collective goals.
25. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash ofCivilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 40 (1993).
26. See BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 944 (Wolters Kluwer
eds., 6th ed. 2011); see U.N. Charter art. 1, para I.
27. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 757
(Oxford Univ. Press eds., 8th ed. 2012).
28. See CARTER & WEINER, supra note 26, at 948.
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are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .. ."29 Part III
will show that there is a tension between these two values and
peacekeeping missions. The values of non-interference and strict
adherence for state sovereignty often get swept under-the-rug when it
inconveniences state agendas, particularly those of Western states like the
United States. 30 It is important to note that, although the United States
it nevertheless strongly opposes
often engages in foreign intervention, 31
interference in its own domestic affairs.
Furthermore, the drafters of the U.N. Charter believed in the
promotion of human rights. This is an area where U.N. values and
Western values overlap. Respect for human rights was codified in Article
1 of the U.N. Charter which lists "promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights" as one of the purposes of the United Nations. Moreover,
the U.N. Charter calls for "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion." 32 Pursuant to Article 56 of the U.N.
Charter, all members are required to further the purposes of the United
Nations both jointly and separately. Therefore, all Member States of the
United Nations must take action to promote human rights. The General
Assembly passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 to
and set forth a
further elaborate upon the meaning of human rights
33
standard that all Member States agreed to abide by.
The Security Council is the core of the collective security system in
the United Nations, which bears the responsibility to address any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. 34 In order to resolve
a threat to the international system, the Security Council may employ
37
provisional measures, 35 non-forcible measures, 3and the use of force.
Therefore, the Security Council is, in essence, the enforcement organ of

29. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 7.
30. See Phil C. W. Chan, A Keen Observer of the InternationalRule of Law? International
Law in China's Voting Behaviour andArgumentation in the United Nations Security Council, 26
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 875, 907 (2013).

31. This view is generally reflected by Justice Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court
in his opposition to considering foreign law in court decisions. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A
Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]Kind": The Value of Comparative Perspective in
ConstitutionalAdjudication26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 927, 928 (2010) (discussing the value behind
using foreign cases to inform decisions in domestic courts).
32. See U.N. Charter art. 55(c).
33. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(I1I) (Dec. 10, 1948) (the list of fundamental human rights includes the right to
life, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition on torture, the right not to be arbitrarily arrested).
34. See U.N. Charter art. 39.
35. See id.art. 40.
36. See id. art. 41.
37. See id. art. 42.
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the United Nations. 38 The Security Council has a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Pursuant to Articles 25 and 48, the Security Council acts on behalf of
Member States who, by virtue of U.N. membership, agreed to carry out
its decisions that prevail over any other legal obligation. 39 Thus, Security
Council decisions to intervene in a conflict with the physical force are
exceptions to the U.N. general prohibition on the use of force.
Although not always distinguished by scholars, Western values and
the values underlying the United Nations are not identical. The United
Nations was created to foster an international legal order to prevent the
use of physical force except in limited circumstances. Western values,
however, incorporate ideas of democracy and individualism, for example.
It is significant to note that there is an overlap between Western values
and the values expressed in the U.N. Charter, such as the promotion of
human rights. As Part V demonstrates, Chinese values are not markedly
converging with Western values. Instead, China's behavior seems to be
conforming more to values underpinning the United Nations and the
Security Council.
III. CHINA'S

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

China has historically kept a low profile within the United Nations.
Chinese foreign policy traditionally emphasized a strict adherence to state
sovereignty and the non-interference in other states' internal affairs.4"
Scholars have noted that "China emphasizes far more often than other
countries the importance of sovereignty as central to management of its
domestic and foreign policies . . . ." However, since Deng Xiaoping's
open-door policy and reform, the PRC has exponentially increased its
participation within the United Nations and the Security Council. In fact,
the PRC actively supports multilateral peacekeeping missions. The
PRC's view on the prominence of state sovereignty does not easily
reconcile with peacekeeping missions that have sovereignty-eroding
characteristics.
This Part of the Article proceeds as follows. Part A discusses China's
history in the United Nations and its general voting behavior. Part B
addresses U.N. peacekeeping missions and sanctions regimes, as well as
38.

See CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 759.

39. See U.N. Charter art. 103.
40. See Jonathan E. Davis, From Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position on
HumanitarianIntervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217, 224
(2011).
41. Jan Wouters & Mattieu Burnay, The EU and Asia in the United Nations Security
Council 13 (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 78, 2011).
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China's increased involvement therein.
A. China's History and Voting Behavior in the UnitedNations
Since 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded the
PRC, Chinese foreign policy has adhered to a strict interpretation of state
sovereignty and insistence on non-interference in the internal affairs of
other states.4 2 This is partly due to historic foreign invasions of China and
its self-described pattern of humiliation from 1839 to 1949.43
Specifically, the Opium Wars and Sino-Japanese wars remain in China's
collective memory. 4 In addition, China has "an ideological mistrust of
Western motivations-a legacy of historical experience as well as
Communism's opposition to Western imperialism-[which] continues to
color Chinese attitudes. . ." toward other states.45
At its inception, the PRC was not formally recognized as the
government of China and the Chinese U.N. seat was held by the Republic
of China (Taiwan) instead.46 China also distrusted the United Nations
because of the direct clashes between Chinese troops and U.N. forces
during the 1951 Korean War, which resulted in the U.N. branding China
as an aggressor. 47 This only led the PRC to further resent the United
Nations and see it as a means for the United States
and the Soviet Union
48
to expand their respective spheres of influence.
It was not until 1971 that the PRC obtained a seat at the United
Nations and in the Security Council when it replaced Taiwan. 49 Between
1971 and 1980, the PRC had its own voting style, often referred to as the
"fifth voting style," where it was present for each vote, but did not
participate and chose to abstain. 50 This is how it reconciled being a
member of the P5 and its strict adherence to state sovereignty.
Additionally, this is also how the PRC voiced its opposition to
peacekeeping missions and, furthermore, refused
to pay its annual
51
peacekeeping contribution and deploy troops.
Beginning in the 1980s, the PRC's voting style began to shift within
the Security Council as Deng Xiaoping led China to become open to

42.
43.
44.

See Davis, supra note 40, at 224.
See id. at 277.
See, e.g., Wouters & Burnay, supra note 41, at 10.

45.
46.

Davis, supra note 40, at 278.
See, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 18, at 67.

47.
48.

See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 2009, supra note 19, at 3.
See id at 3.

49.
50.

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id. at 4-5.

51. See M. Taylor Fravel, China's Attitude Toward UN. Peacekeeping OperationsSince
1989, 36 ASIAN SURVEY 1102, 1103-04 (1996).
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peaceful relations with the West. 52 The first U.N. peacekeeping operation
the PRC voted for was Resolution 495 authorizing an extension of the
U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in 198 1.53 Throughout the 1980s, the
PRC continued to regularly abstain, but it began providing explanations
for its abstentions.54 Also during that time period, the PRC began to
financially contribute to peacekeeping operations and then deployed its
first personnel to peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and
Africa.
The Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 created domestic instability
within certain regions of China. The military force the PRC used against
its own citizens to quell the protests shocked the world. As a result, China
became the target of sanctions that individual states imposed because
China's P5 status at the United Nations prevented a collective response.56
This most likely makes the PRC more reluctant to support sanctions in
the Security Council because it had once been a target of sanctions
itself.57 It is further inclined to engage in diplomacy instead of resulting
to Security Council action.58
Due to historical passivity demonstrated in the Security Council, the
PRC's voting patterns are unique. Despite the uncooperative portrayal
Western media accords the PRC in controversial Security Council
peacekeeping and sanctions efforts, 59 the PRC uses its veto less than any
other P5 member. 60 The PRC has only used its veto eight times since
joining the Security Council; this is in stark contrast to the 78 resolutions
vetoed by the United States between 1971 and 2012 and the 24 U.K.
vetoes during the same period. 6' But the PRC's infrequent use of its veto
power is only part of the story.
Instead of using its veto power to demonstrate non-support, the PRC
often abstains from voting. It is fair to view the PRC's abstentions as
statements of non-support.6 2 When a P5 member abstains from a vote, it
52. See Fullilove, supranote 18, at 69.
53.

See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 2009, supra note 18, at 5.

54.
55.
56.
57.

See, e.g., id.
See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 69.
See id. at 75.
See id.

58. See id.
59. See generallyDiplomats: Russia, China Skip Talks on UN Security CouncilAction on
Syria HumanitarianCrisis, Fox NEWS (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/02/

10/diplomats-russia-china-skip-talks-on-un-security-council-action-on-syria/ (arguing that the
PRC and Russia refused to attend a Security Council meeting regarding the deteriorating situation
in Syria and accuses both states of supporting the Assad regime).
60.
61.

See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 72.
See U.N. Security Council, Veto List, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact

vetoen.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Veto List]; Chan, supra note 30, at 889.
62. See, e.g., Ivan W. Rasmussen, The Changing Politics of Peacekeeping: China's Impact
on United Nations Peacekeeping (Apr. 2011)
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"withholds from the proposed action the legitimacy that an affirmative
vote from it may provide." 63 This is particularly influential due to the
recent practice of treating Security Council resolutions as foundations for
international norms that have the potential to rapidly become customary
international law. The fact that a proposed resolution does not receive a
positive vote from a Member State may serve as evidence that the
abstaining state does not believe the resolution complies with
international law. Between 1990 and 2012, the PRC abstained from
thirty-eight votes regarding Chapter VII resolutions and eighteen nonChapter VII resolutions, which represents the most abstentions by any P5
member. 64
Any study of Chinese voting patterns in the Security Council must
also take into account Russia's voting behavior. China and Russia often
look to each other for mutual support. Typically, the Security Council is
separated into two different voting blocs: China and Russia on the one
hand, and the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on the other
hand. 65 The PRC has never exercised its veto alone and has abstained
from votes alone only four times.66 However, it is important to note that
perspectives on the international system and
the two states have separate
67
distinct foreign policies.
The relations between China and Russia have been strained recently.
Political unrest within Crimea, a dominantly Russian peninsula within
Ukraine, triggered Russian intervention on behalf of the pro-Russian
protesters. 68 Russian troops took control of Crimea with little bloodshed
at the horror of the Ukrainian government. 69 This drew the severe
condemnation from much of the international community. 70 On March
16, 2014, about ninety-seven percent of Crimeans voted to secede from
University), http://sites.tufts.edu/ivanwr/files/2012/06/Changing-Politics-of-Peacekeeping-China
s-impact-on-UN-Peacekeeping.pdf; see Chan, supra note 30, at 890.
63. Chan, supra note 30, at 890.
64. See id.
65.
66.

See, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 18, at 72-73.
See Katie Lynch, China and the Security Council: Congruence of the Voting Between

PermanentMembers, in 5 CHINA PAPERS 1, 26-27 (New Zealand Contemporary China Research
Centre ed., 2009) (noting that there are four votes that only China abstained from including once
in 1999 during the Kosovo conflict, once in a resolution imposing measures against the Taliban,
and twice regarding U.N. membership issues).
67. See, e.g., Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, The Positions of
Russia and China at the UN Security Council in the Light of Recent Crises, at 4, COM (2013)
433.800 final (Mar. 1, 2013).
68. See Timeline: Ukraine's Political Crisis, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 20, 2014, 05:48 GMT),

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/201 4/03/timeline-ukraine-political-crisis-20 1431143722
854652.html.
69.

Id.

70. Id. (on March 3, 2014, NATO released a statement that Russia was threatening peace
and security in Europe).
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Ukraine and join Russia while thousands of armed Russian troops
occupied the peninsula.7 ' Western leaders argued that this referendum
was illegal under Ukrainian law and violated Ukrainian sovereignty. 72 As
a result, the Security Council considered a proposed resolution declaring
the secession illegal.73 Unsurprisingly, Russia vetoed the draft
resolution.74
The PRC's reaction to the Crimean situation has been interesting to
say the least. Although the PRC often votes with Russia, it decided to
abstain from the vote on the draft resolution.75 The PRC's decision to
abstain reflects complex interests in conflict with each other. On one
hand, the PRC seems to be reluctant to oppose Russian action. But on the
other hand, the PRC also has an interest in objecting to secessionist
movements because of its own domestic situation, as will be discussed
below. It is too early to tell what this means for the perceived RussiaChina voting bloc within the Security Council, but it does show that the
PRC does not blindly support Russia to the detriment of its own interests.
In line with states acting out of self-interest, which will be described
in detail in Part V, the PRC and Russia work with each other to balance
perceived U.S. hegemony. 76 Recently, China and Russia have further
converged to balance against the West because of the aftermath of the
global financial crisis that led to increased criticism of the Western value
of free markets.77 Specifically for China, this has coincided with Xi
Jinping's vigorous foreign policy in pursuit of China's territorial claims
and the PRC becoming more assertive in the international arena. 78
B. The Rise of Peacekeepingand Sanctions Regimes
The United Nations and the Security Council were created in response
to the interstate violence of World War II. However, the rate of interstate
conflicts has significantly decreased in relation to the increasing rate of
intrastate conflicts. This has forced the United Nations, and the Security
Council in particular, to adapt to this new reality and make more

71. See David M. Herszenhorn, Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine as Russian Troops
Keep Watch, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/europe/
crimea-ukraine-secession-vote-referendum.html?_r-l.
72. Id.
73. See UN Security CouncilAction on CrimeaReferendum Blocked, U.N. NEWS CENTRE,
(Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/story.asp?NewslD=47362&Cr=Ukrain
e&CrI=#.U1 RuUPIdUII.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, supra note 67, at 10.
77. See id at l2.
78. See id.
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decisions regarding internal conflicts and human rights violations.79
Due to the increase in intrastate conflicts, the United Nations has
become involved in more peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping missions
occur when a group of states employ the use of force in another state's
sovereign territory to protect the host state's people from mass atrocities,
crimes against humanity, genocide, or human rights abuses. 80 Between
2003 and 2011, the U.N. peacekeeping budget increased from about
2 billion dollars to 8 billion dollars per year. 8' The statistics gathered by
the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are
telling. In June 2013, the UNHCR reported that global forced
displacement82 was at an 18-year high with more than 45.2 million people
displaced by the end of 2012.83
The Security Council has a monopoly over the use of force pursuant
84
to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which is binding upon all members.
Chapter VII is an exception to the principle of non-interference in other
state's internal affairs outlined in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter because
it authorizes the Security Council to use physical force in a conflict which
it deems a threat to international peace and security. 85 Therefore,
peacekeeping missions are an exception to the general prohibition on the
use of force codified in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
The Security Council has used sanctions regimes more frequently
since the end of the Cold War. 86 Sanctions are often used in situations
where diplomacy alone does not resolve the conflict and military
87
intervention is unavailable due to political dissent and financial cost.
Although "sanctions" are not mentioned by name in the U.N. Charter,
Article 41 has been interpreted to give the Security Council the right to
impose sanctions in reaction to a threat to international peace and
security. 88 In addition to authorizing peacekeeping missions, Chapter VII
also encompasses sanctions regimes. Different forms of sanctions include
asset freezes, commodity bans, travel bans, arms embargoes, and no-fly

79. Cf Lynch, supra note 66, at 26-27 (arguing that China and Russia cooperate the most
out of any other member in the Security Council).
80. See Davis, supra note 40, at 221; see also infra note 233 (discussing the right to
protect).
81.

See INTERNATIONAL CRISIs GROUP 2009, supra note 19, at 1.

82.

This includes both refugees and internally displaced persons.

83. See The U.N. Refugee Agency (U.N.H.C.R.), Displacement: The New 21st Century
Challenge, June 19, 2013, U.N.H.C.R./B. Sokol (2013), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
51c071816.html.
84. See CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 758.

85.
86.

See, e.g., Davis, supra note 40, at 222-23.
See Carisch & Rickard-Martin, supranote 8, at 2.

87.

Cf id.

88.

See, e.g., id. at 2-3.
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zones. 89 Sanctions regimes, combined with the option of the use of
physical force in peacekeeping missions, provide the Security Council
with mechanisms to persuade states to behave a certain way and
enforcement measures if states do not comply.
The changing landscape of the international system has created
tension for both Russia and China who have experienced, and are
currently dealing with, separatist movements and problematic human
rights records. 90 The fear the PRC and Russia share is foreign intervention
in separatist movements, which both states tend to handle with domestic
military presence. For example, the largest, and often most violent,
secession movements in China are in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner
Mongolia. 91 The PRC's reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of
other states stems, in part, from the ongoing ethnic and religious violence
in China itself.92 During the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, the PRC showed
resentment in Western scrutiny of its treatment of minorities.93 The
PRC's own internal struggle for domestic stability and fear of outside
intervention shape the way it approaches other states' that experience
similar conflict.
Taiwan remains an especially sensitive issue for the PRC. Although
relations between mainland China and Taiwan have eased over the years,
the PRC unequivocally adheres to the One China policy. During the
1990s, the PRC either vetoed or threatened to veto peacekeeping missions
in Haiti, Macedonia, and Guatemala because those states formally
recognized Taiwan as separate from China. 94 However, the fact that a
state recognizes Taiwan does not automatically mean the PRC will try to
thwart any peacekeeping mission within that state. 95 Yet, Taiwan still
serves as a limit for Chinese behavior within the Security Council. 96
Both the PRC and Russia have worked to prevent the Security Council
from significant consideration of human rights violations in areas
including Darfur and Zimbabwe. 97 That is not to say that the PRC and
Russia have a complete disregard for human rights violations, as will be
89. Id at 6-7.
90. Lynch, supra note 66, at 26-27.
91. See SHIRK, supra note 10, at 58.
92. See Bernard Yudkin Geoxavier, China As Peacekeeper:An Updated Perspective on
HumanitarianIntervention, 7 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 98, 99 (2012).
93. See Kevin Zickterman, Worse Than "Chinese Water Torture:" The Second Step in
StraighteningOut North Korea May Include PressuringChina to Stop Its RepatriationCampaign

of North Korean Refugees, 25 DCBA BRIEF 30, 35 (2013).
94. See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 70.
95. See id. (noting that the PRC now supports the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) established in 2004).
96. See Stefan Stdhle, China's Shifting Attitude Towards United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, 195 CHINA Q. 631, 653 (2008).
97. See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 78.
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discussed in Part IV; however, it does indicate that the states' internal
conflicts influence their behavior in the Security Council. The potential
for widespread domestic instability influences China to "generally
behave[] like a cautious, responsible power preoccupied with its own
domestic problems and intent on avoiding
conflicts that would disrupt
98
economic growth and social stability."
The PRC adheres to a strict interpretation of state sovereignty and
non-interference in foreign domestic affairs. 99 In combination with
Russia, the PRC strongly supports the idea that "states are the 'exclusive
masters of their internal affairs." ' 100 Recently however, the PRC has
become highly involved in the United Nations. Although the PRC's core
interests remain domestic in nature,101 it has gradually increased its
participation in peacekeeping since the early 1990s.10 2 As of 2011, China
had deployed more than 12,000 police units, medical and engineering
troops, and military observers to U.N. peacekeeping missions. 103 The
individuals China sends to these missions are considered some of the
most professional troops in the world. 10 4 China was contributing a total
of 2,177 troops and personnel to U.N. peacekeeping missions as of March
2014. ' 05 This is in stark contrast to the 120 total personnel from the
0 6
United States and the 357 contributions from the United Kingdom.'
China's increased participation in peacekeeping has added to its prestige
at the United Nations, thereby affecting the level of influence China can
exert over other members at the United Nations.' 0 7 This is exemplified
by the fact that the PRC's heavily supported candidates
are being
10 8
appointed to key posts throughout the United Nations.
98.

SHIRK, supra note 10, at 10.

99. See, e.g., Weiss & Hill, supra note 7, at 137.
100. Alexander Benard & Paul J. Leaf, Modern Threats and the United Nations Security
Council: No Time for Complacency: A Response to Professor Allen Weiner, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1395, 1414 (2010) (quoting Ivo Daalder & James Lindsay, Democraciesof the World, Unite, AM.
INT., Jan.-Feb. 2007, available at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=220).

In fact, China and Russia have halted American action to address internal affairs in Kosovo,
Darfur, and Burma. Id. at 1415.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 18, at 66.
See Weiss & Hill, supra note 7, at 137.
Id.
See id. at 138.
Troop andPolice ContributorsArchive, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, http://www.

un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors-archive.shtml (last visited Apr. 20,
2014). But although this number is high compared to all of the other P5 members, it is still small
in relative terms to the Chinese military, which has over two million personnel. Fullilove, supra
note 18, at 70
106.

Troop andPolice ContributorsArchive, supra note 105.

107. See, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 18, at 67, 70.
108. For example, the PRC heavily supported Dr. Margaret Chan's appointment as DirectorGeneral of the World Health Organization in November 2006. The PRC also strongly backed the
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While China's involvement in peacekeeping missions has grown,
Western countries have seemed to take an opposite approach. Since the
end of the Cold War, Western states have reduced troop contributions to
peacekeeping missions and almost exclusively provide financial
support. 1°9 These states are more sensitive to casualties in peacekeeping
missions, especially when missions do not support direct strategic
interests.' 10 As a general matter, there is less emphasis on the human cost
of sending troops in developing countries."'
In addition to added prestige at the United Nations, China also
receives money from the United Nations for personnel and equipment it
contributes to peacekeeping. 1 2 In many respects, China is "filing a
conspicuous physical vacuum left by Western members of the [P5], who
contribute financially to peacekeeping, but do not commit to significant
'
troop deployment." 13
China's recent increase in participation at the United Nations, and in
particular in peacekeeping operations, seems contradictory to the
traditional Chinese value of non-interference. Therefore, this Article will
next analyze the particular situations where China participated in
peacekeeping missions and draw insight from China's new involvement.
As the Part below will show, there are certain patterns that emerge that
reflect larger Chinese policy considerations.

IV. CASE

STUDIES

A study of the PRC's recent cases of support for peacekeeping
missions and sanctions regimes shows several common threads that
influence its decision-making in the Security Council. Because the PRC
acts out of self-interest, like many other states, it does not engage in
peacekeeping operations for purely humanitarian reasons. The PRC's
self-interest will also be discussed in Part V of this Article, however it is
necessary to consider when analyzing case studies in this Part.
According to several scholars, there are three principles that China
uses when deciding whether to support peacekeeping operations: (1)
appointment of Ban Ki-moon of South Korea as the U.N. Secretary-General. Bonny Ling, China's
PeacekeepingDiplomacy, 17 CHINA RIGHTS F. 47,48 (2007).

109. See

INTERNATIONAL

CRISIS GROUP 2009, supra note 19, at 8 (reporting that the United

States paid nearly 28.38% of the total U.N. peacekeeping budget, which is almost 8 billion a year.
France paid 7.4% of that same budget and the United Kingdom paid 7.8%).
110. See, e.g., id. at 8.

111. Heather Timmons & Neha Thirani Bagri, Poor Nations Fight, Rich Nations Pay, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013), http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/poor-nations-fight-rich-nation
s-pay/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
112. Seeid.
113. Ling, supra note 108, at 48.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

15

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27

host-country consent, (2) the use of force only in self-defense, and (3) the
involvement of relevant regional actors. 1" 4 China has created an
exception to the general requirement of host-country consent that applies15
when there is a complete lack of government in the host country."
Furthermore, China generally supports peacekeeping missions where
there is an internal settlement of the conflict between parties involved." 6
In addition, China is much more likely to support military intervention to
end humanitarian crises if there is Security Council authorization because
Chapter VII represents the only exception to the non-interference
principle within the U.N. Charter. 17 Chapter VII can be triggered only
by Security Council action. Therefore, the use of force must be used as a
last resort.11 ' China is also more likely to become involved in a
peacekeeping mission that has the support of relevant regional
organizations." 9 Regional organizations have "'a unique political, moral
conflict prevention and
and geographical advantage in handling
20
resolution,"' in their particular region.'
In addition to the principles listed above, this Article asserts there are
other considerations at play in China's decision to engage in
peacekeeping operations or impose sanctions regimes through the
Security Council. The PRC also takes into account its economic interests,
regional interests, and level of international pressure to act. This Part will
analyze China's participation, or lack thereof, in conflicts such as Darfur,
Zimbabwe, North Korea, Iran, and Libya. What emerges is a pattern of
China acting out of self-interest. For example, in Darfur, Zimbabwe,
North Korea, and Iran, China has economic and regional interests. The
material interest at play in the PRC's support for actions against the
Qaddafi regime in Libya was its fear of isolation on the issue, which
would in turn draw outside criticism of China's own human rights record.
The lack of international attention paid to the conflict in Zimbabwe and the
PRC's willingness to veto any resolution regarding the situation provides
support for this theory. This Article will take each case study in turn.
114. See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 69-70; INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 2009, supra note
19, at 19.
115. China supported the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia pursuant to Resolution 794
without Somalia's consent. China made it clear that its support for intervention was exceptional
due to the lack of a functioning government in Somalia. See Davis, supra note 40, at 231-32.
116. See Rasmussen, supra note 62, at 15.
117. See Davis, supra note 40, at 220-23.
118. See U.N. Charter art. 33 (requiring Member States to try to resolve all disputes

peacefully).
119.

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIsIs GROUP 2009, supra note 19, at 23.

120. Id. at 24 (quoting Statement by HE. Ambassador Liu Zhenimin on Prevention and
Resolution of Conflicts at the Open Debate of the Security Council, Permanent Mission of the
People's Republic of China to the UN, Aug. 28, 2007 available at http://www.chinaun.org/eng/zghlhgfhphaq/t357122.htm).
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A. Darfur
Beginning in 2003, government-allied Arab Janjaweed militias in
Sudan committed large-scale atrocities against civilians in the western
region of Darfur.121 The conflict was so violent that an agency within the
United Nations declared it to be "'one of the worst humanitarian crises in
the world."",12 2 The Janjaweed militias engaged in a scorched-earth
campaign to achieve ethnic cleansing of Darfur's black African
23
population. 1
The Security Council took action in July 2004 by adopting Resolution
1556, which declared the situation in Darfur to be a threat to international
24
peace and security and a threat to the stability of the entire region.
Resolution 1556 was adopted under Chapter VII and endorsed the
African Union's (A.U.) deployment of troops to the region and demanded
25
that the leader of the Sudan, Khartoum, disarm the Janjaweed militias.
1 26
In addition, an arms embargo was imposed on the Janjaweed militias.
The PRC first approached the crisis with a hardline stance. The
Chinese representative argued that resolving the crisis required the
consent of the Sudanese government, thereby respecting its sovereignty
over its own territory. 27 The PRC abstained in the vote to adopt
Resolution 1556.128 The PRC did not agree with the obligatory nature of
the Chapter VII powers exercised in Resolution 1556 and took the
position that the resolution would make matters worse. 129 The PRC
reiterated this reasoning when it abstained in voting for Resolution 1672,
which imposed financial sanctions and travel bans on certain individuals
involved in the conflict. 130 Although not specifically mentioned by
Chinese representatives as reasons for its non-support, the principles of
non-interference and state sovereignty were evidently at play.' 3 ' This
position is supported by the fact that the PRC did support the regional
organization peacekeeping mission, the A.U. Mission in Sudan (AMIS),

121. See Davis, supra note 40, at 265.
122. Id. (quoting HumanitarianandSecurity Situations in Western Sudan Reach New Lows,
UN Agency Says, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 5, 2003), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewslD=9094&Cr=sudan&Crl=&Kwl=Humanitarian+and+security+situation+in+westem+S u
dan+reach+new+lows&Kw2=&Kw3=).
123. Davis, supra note 40, at 265.
124. See S.C. Res. 1556, 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004).
125. See id. 6.
126. See id. 7.
127. See Davis, supra note 40, at 266.
128. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5015th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5015 (July 30, 2004).
129. See Davis, supra note 40, at 266.
130. See id. at 266 n.270.
131. Seeid. at267.
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which was deployed with Khartoum's consent. 132
However, in May 2006, the PRC's position began to shift. It supported
the A.U. transition into a U.N. peacekeeping force by voting in favor of
Resolution 1679.133 Despite Resolution 1679 invoking Chapter VII
powers, the PRC conditioned its support on receiving consent from the
Sudanese government. 34 This is also why the PRC abstained from voting
on Resolution 1706 in August 2006, which expanded the mandate of the
U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) by sending troops to enforce the Darfur
Peace Agreement of May 2006 and the N'djamena Ceasefire
Agreement. 35 Resolution 1706 contained a clause inviting the consent of
the Sudanese government for the deployment
because China threatened
36
to use its veto if the language was omitted.1
In the face of escalating violence that was beginning to affect
neighboring Chad, the PRC became subject to international pressure to
become more involved in the crisis. 137 The PRC reacted to this pressure
by working closely with the Sudanese government to obtain acceptance
of the hybrid U.N.-A.U. peacekeeping force in Darfur. 138 In fact,
President Hu Jintao visited Khartoum to attempt to ensure his
cooperation. 39 Further negotiations were conducted with Khartoum in
April 2007, which resulted in an agreement for the deployment of 3000
U.N. peacekeepers to Darfur, including a group of Chinese military
engineers. 40 Finally after receiving Khartoum's consent, the PRC voted
with a unanimous Security Council to adopt Resolution 1769, which
authorized U.N.-A.U. peacekeeping force, the U.N. Assistance Mission
in Darfur (UNAMID). 14' However, the relatively weak language in the
132.
133.

See id.
See id.;
see also S.C. Res. 1679,

3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1679 (May 16, 2006).

134. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5439th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5439 (May 16,
2006) ("[O]ur country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Li Zhaoxing, laid out China's position
[that] ...[w]e believe that, if the United Nations is to deploy a peacekeeping operation in Darfur,
the agreement and cooperation of the Sudanese Government must be obtained.").
135.
136.

See Davis, supra note 40, at 268.
See S.C. Res. 1706, pmbl. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 706 (Aug. 31,2006); see also Davis,

supra note 40, at 268.
137. See Davis, supra note 40, at 269.
138. See Colum Lynch, China Filling Void Left by West in U.N.Peacekeeping, WASH. POST
(Nov. 24, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/23/AR2006
112301007.html.
139. See Howard W. French, Chinese Leader to Visit Sudanfor Talks on Darfur Conflict,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/world/asia/25china.html?n=

top/News/W.
140. See Davis, supra note 40, at 269; see also Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Andrew
Small, China'sNew DictatorshipDiplomacy: Is Beiing Partingwith Pariahs?,87 FOREIGN AFF.
38,47 (2008).
141. See U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 572th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5727 (July 31, 2007)

("The consensus reached by the United Nations-African Union-Sudan tripartite dialogue
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resolution reflects
the PRC's influence and the principle of state
42
sovereignty. 1

The PRC's initially cautious approach toward the crisis in Darfur and
gradual support can be explained by China's relationship with Sudan and
the building up of international pressure. Sudan is a key oil supplier to
China, representing a core Chinese economic interest. 143 As a growing
economy, China has a thirst for a stable energy supply and, therefore, the
PRC has an interest in maintaining good relations with the Sudanese
government.144 Most likely, this is one of the major reasons why the PRC

initially displayed unwillingness to intervene in Darfur. By denying
support to several early resolutions regarding the conflict, the PRC
delayed the formation of UNAMID. 14 5 UNAMID was not created until
July 2007, even though the world community recognized the situation in
Darfur to be one of the most violent conflicts in the world by December
2003.146 The PRC's abstentions denied Security Council action the
legitimacy it would have received by a unanimous front, thereby
weakening initial support of a peacekeeping mission in Darfur.147 This
reflects the unlikelihood of the PRC's support for foreign intervention
when not only the host government is opposed, but the international
148
community is also divided.
On the flip side, there were several factors that caused the PRC to
change its mind. First, the PRC also has an interest in a stable
environment within Sudan to secure the oil supply. Also, the PRC has an
interest in achieving a peaceful and stable international environment to
mechanism on the hybrid operation is the political prerequisite on the basis of which this
resolution is adopted.").
142. For example, the clause describing the protection of civilians stated "without prejudice
to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan." S.C. Res. 1769,
15, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
143. See Geoxavier, supra note 92, at 99; see also Wouters & Bumay, supra note 41, at 12.
144. See, e.g., China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation 12 (2013), at http://ww'w.
safpi.org/sites/default/files/publications/China-AfricaEconomicandTradeCooperation.pdf. Note
however, that recent studies have called into question the growing economy's need for natural
resources. See generallyNo Need to Dig, ECONOMIST (Nov. 2,2013), http://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/215888 4 9 -many-africas-fastest-growing-economies-have-not-relie
d-oil-or-mining-no-need; International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: SubSaharan Africa (Oct. 2013), at http://www.imf.org/extemal /pubs/ft/reo/2013/afr/eng/sreo 1013.
htm (analyzing the growth of sub-Saharan African countries that are not dependent upon

resources).
145. See Rasmussen, supra note 62, at 17-18.
146. Humanitarianand SecuritySituations in Western Sudan Reach New Lows, UNAgency
Says, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 5, 2003), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=9094

&Cr-sudan&Crl=&Kwl=Humanitarian+and+security+situation+in+western+Sudan+reach+ne
w+lows&Kw2=&Kw3=.

147. See supra text accompanying note 63 (explaining why abstention denies legitimacy to
Security Council action).
148. See Rasmussen, supra note 62, at 21.
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prevent internal social unrest 149 and sustain economic growth. 5 °
Moreover, the PRC has an interest in maintaining an image of being a
responsible power so as not to invoke counterbalancing' 5 ' efforts from
other countries. 152 It is the combination of these reasons that led the PRC
to ultimately have a change of heart and become more involved in
securing Khartoum's consent and cooperation.
The PRC faced a significant amount of international pressure to use
its close relationship with the Sudanese government to secure its
authorization to conduct a peacekeeping mission. The PRC would have
faced severe scrutiny if it had not done so.1 53 It is this international
scrutiny that the PRC desires to shield itself from because of its own
historic, and present-day, record of human rights abuses in the separatist
movements in Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia. Therefore, the "Chinese
[are] willing to accept even undesired elements in [a] comprehensive
reputation among developing countries
package rather than damage their
154
by standing on the sidelines."'
As the weak language in Resolution 1769 demonstrated, however, the
PRC did not completely alter its strategy. The PRC participated in the
peacekeeping operation because it was able to secure Khartoum's
consent. In addition, there was an internal peace agreement, the Darfur
Peace Agreement of May 2006, signed by both the Sudanese government
and the Sudan Liberation Army, 5 5 which had support from the African
Union. Both of these factors are significant when the PRC decides
whether to support a peacekeeping mission or sanctions regime.
Therefore, the right circumstances existed to lend support for the PRC's
decision to intervene.
B. Zimbabwe
Since 2000, the government of Zimbabwe, led by President Robert
Mugabe, has been committing violence against civilians who support the
149. This refers to the separatist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, as well
as a general level of contentment amongst the Chinese population.
150. See SHIRK,supra note 10, at 11.
151. For the purposes of this Article, "counterbalancing" is analogous to international pushback.
152. See generally SHIRK, supra note 10, at 136 (discussing how increased Chinese presence
throughout the world creates political backlash that Chinese policymakers must be cautious of in
order not to tarnish China's reputation as a responsible power).
153. See generally Davis, supra note 40, at 269 (explaining how the PRC initially did not
want to get involved in Darfur, but increasing international pressure to participate led the PRC to
engage in talks with the Sudanese government).
154. Stiihle, supra note 96, at 650.
155. See Council on Foreign Relations, Darfur Peace Agreement, May 5, 2006, availableat
http://www.cfr.org/sudan/darfur-peace-agreement-2006/pl 1020.
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opposing political party, the Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC).' 56 The state-sponsored violence spiked in 2008 both before and
after the two political elections held that year. 57 The violence against
civilians represented mass human rights abuses and crimes against
humanity, including mass rape, torture, and killing. 158 Even after winning
the presidential election in June 2008, where he was the only candidate
running, President Mugabe did not relent on the use of violence against
159
political opposition.
In response to the conflict, the African Union passed a resolution in
2008 where it expressed concern over the deteriorating humanitarian
environment in Zimbabwe and encouraged political leaders to enter into
a dialogue to promote peace and democracy.160 However, the African
Union did not support imposing sanctions against Zimbabwe and warned
all states concerned not to engage in behavior that would negatively
impact the conflict.' 6 1 In July 2008, a draft resolution was sent to the
Security Council for a vote but was vetoed by both China and Russia. 162
There were a few factors at play in the PRC's veto of the draft
resolution. The joint China-Russia veto is another example of both states
trying to prevent serious consideration of human rights violations due to
their own internal struggle for domestic stability. 163 As noted in Part III,
the PRC always ensures that it does not exercise its veto power alone;
therefore, the fact Russia was also willing to veto the draft resolution is
another factor to consider in the case study. The traditional Chinese
principles of strict adherence to state sovereignty and non-interference in
another state's domestic matters influenced the PRC's decision to veto. 64
The PRC felt as though the draft resolution far exceeded the scope of the
Security Council's Chapter VII powers because the conflict in Zimbabwe
was not recognized as a threat to international peace and security by
156.

See Robert I. Rotberg, Africa's Mess, Mugabe's Mayhem, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 47 (2000);

INT'L COAL.

FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY

TO

PROTECT,

CRISIS IN

responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-zimbabwe

ZIMBABWE,

http://www.

(last visited Apr. 21,

2014)

[hereinafter CRISIS INZIMBABWE].
157. See CRISIS INZIMBABWE, supra note 156.
158. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Sanctions Against
Zimbabwe Leadership as Two Permanent Members Cast Negative Votes, U.N. Press Release
SC/9396 (July 11, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release SC/9396].
159. See CRISIS INZIMBABWE, supra note 156.
160. See U.N. Press Release SC/9396, supra note 158.
161. See id.
162. The draft resolution called for a plethora of sanctions against Zimbabwe that included
travel bans and an asset freeze on President Mugabe and other high profile individuals. See No
Consensus in Security Council on Zimbabwe Sanctions, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (July 11, 2008),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=27358#.VOpoRHzF8nk.
163. See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 78.
164. See Chan, supra note 30, at 891.
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neighboring states.' 65 The PRC cited the A.U. opposition to sanctions as
a significant determining factor in their analysis.16 6 However, it is curious
to note that the violence in Zimbabwe and ensuing refugee migration
67
have not been considered a threat to international peace and security.'
Moreover, China has economic interests in Zimbabwe, although not
as many as it does in Sudan.' 68 President Hu Jintao announced the states'
continued "strong and deep friendship" when President Mugabe
personally visited China in 2010.169 The PRC and Russia were able to
veto the draft resolution and effectively block any further Security
Council action, in part, due to the low public awareness of the conflict in
Western countries. 170 Unlike the international pressure the PRC received
to intervene in Darfur, China has been able to veto draft resolutions on
Zimbabwe with relatively scant reputational cost. 17' Thus, the worry of
public scrutiny of the PRC's human rights abuses against its own citizens
is not present.
C. Patternsof Inaction in States Seeking Nuclear Proliferation
North Korea and Iran have been rogue states within the international
system for decades. Although there has been no peacekeeping mission
sent to either state, the sanctions regimes imposed against them provide
insight into China's recent engagement within the Security Council.
North Korea and Iran are two states with which China has strong security
ties and economic relationships. Both North Korea and Iran actively
72
engage in illegal weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.
The PRC has evinced a hesitation in imposing sanctions against these
regimes because of its material
interests and Chinese counterbalancing
73
influence.'
Western
against

165.
166.
167.
(implying

See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 2009, supra note 19, at 25.
See id.
See Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, supra note 67, at 7
that other political considerations are at play in the A.U. decision not to support

sanctions against Zimbabwe).
168. See, e.g., Wouters & Burnay, supra note 41, at 12.
169. See Zimbabwe's Mugabe Visits China, Meets Hu, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2010, 09:16
EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/13/ozatp-china-zimbabwe-idAFJOE67COH520l
00813.
170. See Wouters & Burnay, supra note 41, at 12.

171. A reputational cost is a negative consequence to a state's behavior that affects the
state's overall reputation amongst the international community. For example, "the state with a
poor reputation is either excluded from deals or it is charged a high price of admission ... " Rachel
Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231, 245 (2009).

172.

See, e.g., Benard & Leaf, supra note 100, at 1397, 1409.

173.

See id. at 1406.
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1. North Korea
North Korea has drawn severe criticism from the international
community for years. The Six Party Talks began in 2003 in an effort to
end North Korea's nuclear program. 174 The negotiations were derailed in
July 2006 when North Korea fired several long-range missiles in
violation of a 1999 moratorium on such testing. 175 This alarmed much of
the international community and several P5 members called for a strong
response. A draft resolution was presented to the Security Council that
required North Korea to stop the development and deployment of ballistic
missiles, mandated that other states work to prevent the transfer of such
technology to North Korea, and invoked Chapter VII authority. 176
However, the PRC and Russia did not share the outrage the other P5
members displayed. Both states issued press statements that argued any
resolution should not invoke Chapter VII and be left to Member States to
decide what actions to take. 177 Shortly thereafter, the PRC and Russia
offered a rival draft resolution that did not invoke Chapter VII and
instead, introduced voluntary measures states may take in limiting the
technology accessible to North Korea. 17 8 In order to avoid a joint
Chinese/Russian veto, the Security Council passed Resolution 1695
which lacked reference to Chapter VII and, therefore, lacked any
79
enforcement mechanism.1
In October 2006, North Korea detonated a nuclear weapon that again
shocked the world community.180 A few days later, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1718 using its Chapter VII powers, which represented
a compromise between Western powers and China and Russia.1 8 ' The
PRC ensured that any mention of the use of force against North Korea
was excluded.1 82 This represented one of the first times China publically
174.

The negotiations involved North Korea, China, the United States, South Korea, Japan,

and Russia. See Jayshree Bajoria & Beina Xu, The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear
Program, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-

north-koreas-nuclear-program/pl3593 (last updated Sept. 30, 2013).
175. See, e.g., Benard & Leaf, supra note 100, at 1415.
176. See, e.g., id. at 1418; Warren Hoge, UN. Council, in Weakened Resolution, Demands
End to North Korean Missile Program, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/07/16/world/asia/l6nations.html?r=O.
177. See Benard & Leaf, supra note 100, at 1418.
178.

See id. at 1418-19.

179. See id.; see also S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006).
180. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.N. Press Release SC/8853 (Oct. 14, 2006).
181. For example, the clause imposing a thirty-day deadline for North Korea to comply with
Resolution 1695 was removed. See Benard & Leaf, supra note 100, at 1420.
182. See id. However, the resolution did contain an arms embargo, an assets freeze, and a
ban on the sale of all luxury goods to North Korea. See S.C. Res. 1718, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 718
(Oct. 14, 2006).
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criticized its trading partner's behavior.
During this time period, the PRC had a policy of engagement with
North Korea which fostered growing North Korean economic
dependence upon China. In 2007, there was a significant increase in
North Korean exports into China and more than half of North Korean
trade was conducted through Chinese companies. 183 The high levels of
trade between the two countries, which have a common border, have
resulted in "the creation of dense business networks that include major
Chinese and North Korean enterprises, smaller Chinese and North
Korean business, and84 North Koreas with relatives in China who are
permitted to travel."'
The two resolutions passed by the Security Council proved
unsuccessful in constraining North Korean behavior as demonstrated
when North Korea fired a long-range ballistic missile into Japanese
airspace in April 2009.185 Despite seething Western condemnation, the
Security Council took no action because the PRC and Russia argued that
the missile launch did not violate Resolution 1718.186 The lack of Security
Council action with teeth again failed to constrain North Korean behavior
exemplified by another detonation of a nuclear device in May 2009.187
Finally, in June 2009, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII,
unanimously adopted Resolution 1874 which went beyond the scope
of
188
sanctions.
enforce
to
means
new
included
also
and
1718
Resolution
The unanimous vote in favor of Resolution 1874 evinces the PRC's
growing disapproval of North Korea's behavior. According to the
Chinese representative to the Security Council, the PRC supported the
resolution because North Korea had violated previous resolutions and
negatively impacted international peace and stability.' 89 But to ensure
Chinese support, the resolution made clear that the Security Council
183. See Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland, Sanctioning North Korea: The Political
Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation 15 (Peterson Institute for International
Economics, Working Paper No. 09-4, 2009).
184. Id. at 9.
185. See Benard & Leaf, supra note 100, at 1422.
186. See id.; see also DefiantN Korea Launches Rocket, BBC NEWS, (Apr. 5, 2009, 10:09
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7982874.stm.
187. Adding insult to injury, North Korea nullified the Korean War truce agreement and
shot short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan within the same week. See Benard & Leaf, supra
note 100, at 1423.
188. See Haggard & Noland, supra note 183, at 19. The resolution strengthened the importexport ban created in Resolution 1718 on various types of arms, called on Member States to
inspect all vessels going into North Korea, and imposed more stringent monitoring on North
Korean compliance. See id.
189. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Acting Unanimously, Condemns
in Strongest Terms Democratic People's Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions,
U.N. Press Release SC/9679 (June 12, 2009).
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would resolve the issue peacefully.' 90 As a result of Resolution 1874,
North Korea has in fact altered its economic relations with other states to
reduce the impact of the sanctions; thus, signaling that Resolution 1874
has had some success.' 9 ' The level of Chinese dissatisfaction, reflected
by the passage of Resolution 1874, signaled to the North Korean
government that the PRC may enact further sanctions if it did not alter its
behavior. China accounts for about one-third of North Korea's overall
trade and provides significant amounts of foreign aid. 192 Upsetting the
Chinese would negatively impact the North Korean economy perhaps by
cutting-off Chinese oil shipments. 193 Therefore, Chinese cooperation is
critical to have any chance of successfully constrain North Korean
behavior.
The PRC's demonstrated ambivalence toward taking action against
North Korea reflects regional and economic interests. As noted above,
China is North Korea's largest trading partner and, therefore, has an
economic interest in maintaining good relations with North Korea.
Supporting sanctions regimes that would cripple the North Korean
economy would also negatively impact the Chinese economy. Moreover,
having good relations with a state such as North Korea also benefits
China's efforts to counterbalance U.S. power, 194 particularly within
China's geographic region. Some officials in China believe North Korea
95
could act as China's proxy in communication with Iran and Pakistan.1
One of the PRC's main goals within the United Nations is to maintain
regional stability. China and North Korea, share an almost 900 mile long
border. Therefore, any instability in North Korea may spill over into
China.
Respect for human rights is deteriorating in North Korea. The North
Korean government has a history of committing crimes against humanity
against its population through the use of concentration and labor
camps. 196 Historically, North Koreans subject to such severe conditions
would flee into China, and both state's governments "turned a blind eye
to these 'defectors."" 97 However, beginning in the early 2000s, the PRC
changed its policy of ignorance by intercepting these "defectors" and
sending them back to North Korea. 198 The defectors are subject to severe
190.

See id.

191.

See Haggard & Noland, supra note 183, at 23.

192.
193.

See id.
See id.

194. In this context, "power" refers to a state's military capability, economic might, and
general influence within the international system.
195. See Haggard & Noland, supra note 183, at 23.
196. See Zickterman, supra note 93, at 31; see also Human Rights Council Resolution
H.R.C. Res. 19/13, U.N. Doc. A/HR/RES/19 (Apr. 3, 2012).

197. See Zickterman, supra note 93, at 31.
198.

See id.
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punishment upon returning to North Korea and in extreme cases face
most likely, is violating
execution. 199 The PRC's forced repatriation, 200
several multilateral treaties to which it is party.
The PRC maintains this controversial practice because of the fear that
allowing too many defectors across its borders will take away jobs for
Chinese workers in those regions. 20 1 Moreover, the PRC has a significant
interest in preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime that would
destabilize the entire region with an influx of migrants. The PRC is also
reluctant to change its policy because of the resentment it has against the
20 2
West's consistent criticism regarding the treatment of its own citizens.
Thus, the PRC cannot support strong sanctions placed upon North Korea
for fear of the consequences on the ground. Despite the harsher sanctions
the PRC approved in Resolution 1874, it is unlikely China would support
more severe Security Council action, especially when Russia maintains a
similarly ambivalent position. In summation, China's deep economic ties
with North Korea and interest in preventing the collapse of the regime are
why the PRC has worked to dilute any Security Council action taken
against North Korea. Essentially, a stable nuclear North Korea is more
preferable for the PRC than an unstable North Korea, whether or not
armed with nuclear capabilities.
2. Iran
Iran has been considered to be a rogue state by the international
system for decades in its vying for nuclear technology. During the early
years of the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran failed to comply
with obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 20 3 In

February 2006, the matter was referred to the Security Council with the
IAEA claiming that Iranian government exhibited a lack of transparency
of its uranium enrichment activities and a general "absence of confidence
204
that Iran's nuclear program[] is exclusively for peaceful purposes .... "
Despite the urging of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France,
the PRC and Russia announced that they would 20not
support any
5
resolution that imposed binding sanctions against Iran.
199. See id.; see also Kyu Change Lee, Protectionof North Korean Defectors in China and
the Convention Against Torture, 6 REGENT J. INT'L L. 139, 156 (2008).

200. One of these treaties is the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33,
openedfor signatureJuly 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
201. See Zickterman, supra note 93, at 35.
202. See id.
203. See Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT SafeguardsAgreement in
the Islamic Republic ofIran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006).
204. Id.
205. See Benard & Leaf, supra note 100, at 1427.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss1/5

26

Mastroianni: Growing Numbers of Chinese Blue Helmets: China's Changing Role Wi
GROWING NUMBERS OF CHINESE BLUE HELMETS. CHINA 'S CHANGING ROLE

After five months of negotiations, the PRC and Russia agreed to
support Resolution 1737 in December 2006. The resolution called upon
Iran to suspend proliferation efforts and required all states to take action
to prevent Iran from attaining the materials needed for enrichment-related
activities. 20 6 Earlier that same month during the negotiations over
Resolution 1737, the PRC executed a sixteen billion dollar deal to help
Iran develop a gas field.20 7 Not so coincidentally, Resolution 1737 did not
contain any reference to fuel sanctions. 20 8 Although the PRC and Russia
both ended up agreeing to impose sanctions upon Iran, both states drew
out the negotiation process and were able to effectively water-down
sanctions.20 9
Following another report from the IAEA that described Iran's
continued noncompliance, the Security Council passed Resolution
1747,210 which calls upon states "to exercise vigilance and restraint" in
the supply, sale or transfer of conventional arms, but does not impose any
punitive sanctions against Iran. 2 11 Similar to Resolution 1737, this
predecessor resolution was too weak to coerce Iran into compliance with
the NPT. In 2008, the Security Council passed Resolution 1803 which
extended assets freezes and called upon states to monitor activities of
individuals involved with the nuclear proliferation program.2 12 Although
Resolution 1803 is more comprehensive than previous resolutions, it was
still subject to the same dilution effect because of the PRC's and Russia's
2 13
influence.
It was not until June 2010 that the PRC and Russia supported the most
comprehensive sanctions regime to date by voting in favor of Resolution
1929. This shift in position can be attributed to Iran's continued
noncompliance with previous resolutions and escalating behavior. In the
period between 2009 and 2010, the international community became
aware of Iran's secret underground uranium enrichment facility, which
proved to be a catalyst for the resolution.21 4 Resolution 1929 tightened
206. See S.C. Res. 1737,
2-3, U.N. DoC. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006).
207. See Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by Impunity: The History and Consequences of
Failureto Enforce Iranian Violations of InternationalLaw, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 519, 539 n. 178
(2007).
208. See id.
209. See id. For example, the resolution did not contain any reference to the possible use of
force against Iran, which was key to receiving Chinese support. See Benard & Leaf, supra note
100, at 1428.
210. The original draft resolution called for travel bans on Iranian officials and an arms
embargo. Because of Chinese and Russian opposition, however, these provisions were later
removed. See Kittrie, supra note 207, at 541.
211. See S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. DOC. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
212. See S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
213. See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 74.
214. Seeid. at75.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

27

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27

the arms embargo and travel bans associated with individuals involved
with Iranian nuclear programs. 215 Chinese support for such strengthened
on the
sanctions surprised many, but the PRC wanted to avoid isolation
216
issue due to Russia's shift in policy to support further sanctions.
The newest rounds of sanctions imposed against Iran can be explained
by increasing international pressure to act. The PRC's fear of foreign
scrutiny into its own state practices made it unlikely for China to stand
alone in opposing Resolution 1929. Despite the recent rounds of
resolutions, in October 2010 the Obama administration concluded that
Chinese firms were helping Iran develop nuclear technology and asked
the Chinese government to stop helping those companies. 217 This is
indicative of China's economic relationship with Iran.
The PRC protects Iran at the Security Council by diluting the strength
of resolutions because of material self-interest. Iran is China's third
largest oil supplier, which China's growing economy desperately
needs. 218 As stated above, the PRC has invested millions of dollars in
developing Iranian oil and gas fields to feed Chinese consumption.2 19 In
addition, the PRC plans to invest over 200 million dollars to help build a
new highway connecting Tehran to the Caspian coast, as well as allowing
Chinese firms to construct Tehran's new subway system. 220 In many
respects, the PRC cannot afford to distance itself from Iran.
The PRC's traditional adherence to strict state sovereignty affects the
way it views Iran's quest for nuclear proliferation. The status of China as an
emerging great power itself does not make it automatically suspicious of
Iran's quest to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. 221 Similar
to the Chinese relationship with North Korea, having strong ties with Iran
serves as a counterbalance to U.S. power. Moreover, Iran's military buildup
distracts the United States and the world community, from China's growing
military strength.2 22 Therefore, despite Iran's poor reputation in the
international community, Chinese economic and regional interests in
maintaining good relations prove too valuable for the PRC to sacrifice.
215. In addition, the resolution invoked an assets freeze of certain Iranian organizations and
called on Member States to inspect Iranian cargo and prevent Iranian banks from opening on their
territory. See S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).
216. See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 75.
217. See id.
218. See James Phillips & Peter Brookes, Iran's Friends Fend Off Action at the UN.
Security Council: Here's Why, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 11, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/

research/reports/2006/05/irans-friends-fend-off-action-at-the-un-security-counil-heres-why;but
see International Monetary Fund, supra note 144, at 31, 52 (arguing that growing economies do
not necessarily need natural resources to flourish).
219.

See Phillips & Brookes, supra note 218.

220. See id.
221.

See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 75.

222.

See Phillips & Brookes, supranote 218.
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D. R2P andLibya
The Libyan crisis was birthed in the wake of the Arab Spring. The
democratic demonstrations held in Tunisia and Egypt incited similar
protest movements within Libya against Colonel Qaddafi's oppressive
regime in February 2011. However, the Libyan conflict quickly took a
more violent turn than in Tunisia and Egypt due to differences in the
2 23
Libyan political system.
The protests generated popular support in Libya, and the Qaddafi
regime responded by using military force. 224 In February 2011, the Arab
League suspended Libya's participation in the organization because of
the brutal use of force against civilians. 225 A few days later, the Human
Rights Council passed a resolution regarding the human rights abuses in
Libya and called for the deployment of an independent international
commission of inquiry.2 26 The Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011 urging the end of Violence in
Libya and referring the situation to the International Criminal Court
(ICC). Furthermore, the resolution implemented a sanctions regime
against the Libyan government with an assets freeze, travel ban, and arms
227
embargo.
Using Resolution 1970 as a catalyst, the leadership of the opposition
movement organized into the Interim Transitional National Council
located in Benghazi.2 2 8 The Arab League noted that the Libyan
government primarily used military aircrafts against civilians. 2 29
Therefore, the Arab League called on the Security Council to impose a
no-fly zone to cripple the Libyan government's ability to commit human
2 30
rights abuses.
223. When Presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali came to power in both Egypt and Tunisia
respectively, the states had been well-established prior to their ascension to power and would be
able to survive without the respective rulers. After overthrowing the monarchy in 1969, Qaddafi
created a regime dependent upon his role, which is why the conflict in Libya took such a violent
turn. See International Crisis Group, PopularProtest in North Africa and the Middle East ():
Making Sense ofLibya (June 6, 2011), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-

africa/north-africa/libya/10 7 -popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-v-making-sens
e-of-libya.aspx.
224. See SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, Libya Chronology of Events http://www.security
councilreport.org/chronology/libya.php?page (last revised Jan. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Libya
Chronologyof Events].
225. See id.
226. See Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights Council Passes
Resolution on Libya in Special Session (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD= 10768&LangID=E.
227. See S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
228. See id; see also Libya Chronology of Events, supra note 224.
229. See Libya Chronologyof Events, supra note 224.
230. See id.
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After hearing rumors that the Security Council may impose a no-fly
zone, Qaddafi issued a chilling threat to civilians in Benghazi that an
attack was imminent. 23 ' Among further reports of torture, rape, and mass
civilian casualties, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 which
employed the language of "all necessary measures," excluding a ground
troop deployment, to protect civilians in Libya and enforce Resolution
1970.232 This is the first resolution passed by the Security Council that
explicitly used the responsibility to protect (R2P) 233 civilians as the
reason for intervention against the host state government.2 3 4 Resolution
1973 imposed a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and strengthened the
sanctions regime. 235 The PRC chose to abstain from voting on Resolution
1973.
In March 2011, air strikes led by the United Kingdom, United States,
and France began to dismantle the Qaddafi regime. 236 The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) then took over all military operations to
enforce Resolution 1973.237 At a meeting in Beijing, leaders of China,
Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and India began to express dissatisfaction
with the NATO intervention, claiming that Resolution 1973 was "being
interpreted arbitrarily. ' 238 The next day, heads of state from the
aforementioned Western states announced that a Libyan future with
Qaddafi was no longer an option. 239 After months of NATO-led military
intervention, the mission terminated in October 201 1.240 The Security
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2009 which created a
peacekeeping mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and modified the sanctions
regime. 24 1 The Qaddafi regime was effectively ousted from power.
The PRC's support for Resolution 1970 and later abstention in the
vote for Resolution 1973 is telling. Before the Libyan crisis, China's
relationship with Libya had its ups and downs. Both states disapproved
of Western imperialism; however, the PRC distrusted the Qaddafi
231.

See David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Qaddafi Warns ofAssault on Benghazi as

UN. Vote Nears, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/
18libya.html?pagewanted=all.
232. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
233. Generally, the responsibility to protect (R2P) refers to circumstances when a state's
population is "suffering serious harm, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to avert it
or is itself the perpetrator, the principle of non-intervention yields to an international
'responsibility to protect."' Davis, supra note 40, at 258.
234. See Carisch & Rickard-Martin, supra note 8,at 3.
235. See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 232.
236. See Libya Chronologyof Events, supranote 224.
237. See id.
238.

See id.

239.
240.
241.

See id.
See id.
See S.C. Res. 2009, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2009 (Sept. 16, 2011).
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regime. 242 Despite Libya's vast oil and gas reserves, the PRC remained
suspicious of the Libyan government due to disrupted business plans and
its criticism of China's presence in Africa.243 In a speech in February
2011, Qaddafi declared he would defeat all rebels and idealized the way
the Chinese government handled the Tiananmen Square Riots to defeat
political unrest. 244 The PRC quickly tried distancing itself from Qaddafi's
remarks and censored the speech in Chinese media.245 It was not
surprising that the PRC supported Resolution 1970 in the same month,
especially considering the A.U. support for Security Council action.
However, the PRC changed its position on the Libyan crisis when it
abstained from voting on Resolution 1973. When it came time to vote for
Resolution 1973 the international community lacked consensus,
246
especially with the A.U. opposition to any NATO intervention.
However, the "support of the Arab League and African Union for [the]
no-fly zone was plainly critical to China's willingness not to block
[Resolution] 1973."247 Therefore, the regional support and public outcry
against the mass atrocities committed by the Qaddafi regime made
Resolution 1973 too costly to veto. As noted above, the PRC is extremely
reluctant to remain politically isolated on an issue involving human rights
abuses to prevent serious consideration of its own less-than stellar record.
V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM CHINA'S RECENT BEHAVIOR AND
LOOKING FORWARD

History and the case studies above illuminate many lessons for future
use. Part A of this Section shows that there are several themes emerging
in the PRC's policy of participation in peacekeeping operations and
sanctions regimes. This Article argues that China is a rational actor,
pursuing its self-interest, which is the same way virtually all other states
behave. The PRC's traditional value of non-interference in other state
affairs arose out of Chinese self-interest; however, China's increasing
presence throughout the world has altered those interests and changed the
leadership's foreign policy accordingly. Part B argues that China is not
experiencing a significant shift toward Western values. Instead, China's
values seem to be shifting in a different direction toward values
242.

See Andrew Higgins, For China, Relations with Libya a Balancing Act, WASH. POST

(Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/libya-policy-a-balancingact-for-china-as-moammar-gaddafis-rule-collapses/2011/08/26/gIQAnlKKgJstory.html.
243.
244.
245.

See id.
See id.
See id.

246. See Carisch & Rickard-Martin, supra note 8, at 3.
247. Fullilove, supra note 18, at 71.
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underpinning the United Nations and the Security Council. Part C
discusses the potential for Security Council action in the unfolding Syrian
crisis. And finally, it provides insight in how to move forward with
China's developing case-by-case approach to Security Council sanctions
regimes and peacekeeping missions.
A. Emerging Patternsand China'sSelf-Interest
States are inherently self-interested. Each state's particular interests
serve as the primary motivation for its behavior. 248 "International law
emerges from states' pursuit of self-interested policies on the
international stage. International law is, in this sense, endogenous to state
interests. It is not a check on state self-interest; it is a product of state selfinterest. 249 It is not uncommon for states to want more power250 than
what they already have. 251 The acquisition of power is a high priority for
great powers and aspiring great powers alike. Because power is limited
within the international system, the ascension to power of one state, often
results in another state's decrease in power. 252 This phenomenon is a
reason why there has been concern in the United States over China's rise
to great power status. 253 And naturally rising great powers, like China,
multipolar system where the United
would welcome the emergence of a 254
States possesses less relative power.
The international system is a self-help world because states cannot
depend upon each other for security. "States operating in a self-help
world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not
subordinate their interests to those of other states." 255 States may have a
plethora of different goals at any given time. Many goals, such as
promoting human rights, often have very little to do with security-related
goals. Often, a state will pursue these types of desires as long as it does
248. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 2 (2001). Note
that the Author of this Article is citing Mearsheimer for his theory that centers upon the belief that

all states act out of self-interest and possess aspirations to acquire more power in particular
circumstances. Other theories proposed by Mearsheimer are outside the scope of this study.
249. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005).

250. See supra note 194 for definition of"power."
251. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 248, at 2; see also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note
249, at 3.
252. For example, there was a bipolar system during the Cold War period with the United
States and Russia exercising dominance over their respective spheres of influence. When the
Soviet Union collapsed, it left the United States in a more powerful position than it was in before
the collapse.
253. See, e.g., John F. Ikenberry, The Rise of China andthe Future of the West, 87 FOREIGN
AFF. 23 (2008) (arguing that the rise of China may trigger a "hegemonic transition" unless the
United States actively tries to bind China to the existing Western order).
254. See Benard & Leaf, supra note 100, at 1405.
255. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 248, at 33.
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not negatively impact its place in the international balance of power.256
For example, despite the high level of U.S. involvement in the Libyan
crisis, the United States has not taken serious action in the Congo where
mass atrocities are being committing against the civilian population.2 5 7
The lack of a U.S. response to the death of millions within the Congo may
be explained, in part, by the fact that58 two of its allies, Rwanda and
2
Uganda, are perpetrating the violence.
This reflects the larger conclusion that a state often possesses mixed
motives when engaging in foreign intervention. The decision to
intervene, through the Security Council for example, may reflect several
different interests regarding the promotion of human rights,
humanitarianism, economic gain, reputational costs, or strategic
concerns. 259 Thus, concern over human rights or humanitarian
intervention is often not the only reason why a state will participate in
peacekeeping missions or sanctions regimes.
Certain patterns are emerging in the instances of Chinese support for
peacekeeping missions and sanctions regimes, as well as commonalities
between the situations where the PRC has not provided support. The
recent increase in involvement in peacekeeping operations seems
paradoxical to the traditional Chinese values of state sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. The PRC now adopts a
case-by-case approach when determining whether to lend support to
peacekeeping operations or sanctions regimes. 260 The PRC's balancing
of its traditional values and its growing material interests throughout the
world helps explain the PRC's current voting pattern.
According to several scholars, when three specific principles are
present in a conflict, the PRC is more likely to intervene and support
Security Council action. 26' As described in Part IV of this Article, these
three principles are host-country consent, the use of force for selfdefense, and the cooperation of regional actors. However, this Article
also adds three other considerations to the mix. These factors are Chinese
economic interests, regional interests, and a high level of international
pressure to act. The fact that China is a rising great power with growing
256. See id. at 46.
257. See Kambale Musavuli, Syria, the DRC and the 'Responsibility to Portect': the US
Double Standard(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www. huffingtonpost.com/kambale-musavuli/syria-the-

drc-and-the-res b 4248673.html.
258. See id.
259.
260.

See generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 249, at 110.
See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 2009, supra note 19, at i (describing how China's

approach to peacekeeping is determined on a case by case basis); see also Geoxavier, supra note
92, at 98 (discussing that China will continue to address crises through a pragmatic case by case
analysis).
261.
note 18.

See, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 18, at 69; INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 2009, supra
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economic, regional, and reputational interests further supports this
conclusion.
The PRC's economic interests were implicated in four of the five case
studies. For example, both Sudan and Iran are two of China's largest oil
suppliers. This added another level to the PRC analysis in deciding
whether to impose sanctions or engage in peacekeeping operations. As
mentioned above, China's growing economy requires a stable source of
oil and, therefore, the PRC has a significant interest in maintaining good
relations with the Sudan and Iran. 262 A similar dynamic plays out in the
PRC's ambivalence toward North Korea because of the large amount of
trade between the two states.
The North Korean case study also exemplifies the influence China's
regional interests have on its decision making within the Security
Council. By virtue of having a common border, a pattern emerged of
North Koreans crossing into Chinese territory to flee from human rights
abuses committed by the North Korean government. Since the 2000s, the
PRC has forcefully repatriated these "defectors" in a protectionist effort
to preserve jobs for Chinese citizens. It is highly likely that Chinese
officials understand that any collapse of the North Korean regime would
create an influx of migrants into China which would destabilize the
region. This is a reason why the PRC must be more cautious than other
states in their relations with North Korea.
The level of international pressure to act in humanitarian crises
coincides with reputational interests the PRC has in maintaining an image
of being a responsible power. 263 The lower the level of international
pressure on the PRC to act, the more likely it will adhere to the traditional
principle of non-interference. This is supported by the PRC's lack of
willingness to intervene in Zimbabwe. There has been less international
pressure for the PRC to support peacekeeping efforts within Zimbabwe
because many of the neighboring states within the region do not
recognize the conflict as a threat to international peace and security.
Because the conflict has not received a high level of international
condemnation, the264
PRC's veto of the July 2008 draft resolution had scant
reputational costs.

However, the situation in Libya represented the flip-side of this factor.
The international community mobilized into action after Qaddafi
blatantly threatened civilians in Benghazi. Although the PRC, along with
a handful of other states, voiced reservations about establishing a no-fly
262. See International Monetary Fund, supra note 144.
263. The Author does not believe that the PRC would succumb to international pressure in
situations regarding internal disputes that threaten domestic stability. The Chinese Communist
Party's number one priority is to maintain one-party control over China. See SHIRK, supra note
10, at 8.
264. See supra note 171 for the definition of a reputational cost.
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zone, vetoing Security Council action would have imposed high
reputational costs. Specifically, it may have drawn intense scrutiny from
a variety of states, potentially undermining the image of China being a
responsible power. In addition, the PRC's reluctance to veto a Security
Council resolution without Russian support also may have influenced its
decision to abstain from voting on Resolution 1973. Thus, the high level
of international pressure surrounding the Libyan crisis was likely
influential in the PRC's decision to support Resolution 1970.
But, one may wonder just how much influence the international
community's sentiments have on the PRC's decision making.
Determining how much Chinese leaders care about what other states
think is no easy task. Nevertheless, the fact that the PRC has continued
to foster an image of being a responsible power indicates that officials are
influenced by external pressure. 265 According to one scholar, the PRC is
following a strategy of "power maximization" and "threat
minimization. "266 The PRC works to prevent any counterbalancing
against its growing power that would damage its relationship with
Western powers, especially the United States, and jeopardize the Chinese
economy. 2 67 President Hu Jintao's coining the phrase "peaceful rise"

reflects an understanding that promoting a peaceful external environment
will kill two birds with one stone--continued economic success while
268
discouraging social unrest.

Becoming a cooperative member within the Security Council furthers
the PRC's goal to cultivate a non-threatening image. Peacekeeping is one
of the most prominent U.N. activities. China's increased participation in
peacekeeping missions adds to its level of prestige within the United
Nations and its reputation abroad. 269 The provision of Chinese
peacekeepers "serve[s] to counter fears of China's growing power.., by
deploying military personnel for peaceful ends." 270 Thus, it is critical to
incorporate the PRC's self-interest within the equation; China's increased
participation in the Security Council is a function of diversified interests
that continue to adapt with China's increase in power.
Due to the domestic nature of the PRC's primary policy goals,
international pressure is not always an influential factor in the decisionmaking process. The CCP's survival depends upon domestic stability,
which precludes international considerations from becoming a priority

265. See SHIRK, supra note 10, at 136.
266. Andrew C. Blandford, ReputationalCosts Beyond TreatyExclusion: InternationalLaw
Violations As Security ThreatFocalPoints, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 669, 722 (2011).
267. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 2009, supra note 19, at 13.

268.

See SHIRK, supra note 10, at 108.

269.
270.

See Fullilove, supra note 18, at 70.
See INTERNATIONAL CRIsis GROUP 2009, supra note 19, at i.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

35

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27

for the PRC.27 ' When the CCP feels threatened, Chinese leaders are much
less cautious about quashing the perceived threat in an effort to maintain
one-party rule. For example, the PRC sent its military into Tiananmen
Square to violently quell protesters despite large reputational costs.
Leading up to that decision, many CCP members showed ambivalence
toward sending the army for fear of jeopardizing economic interests
around the world.2 7 2 However, senior CCP leadership, who supported
military involvement, won out after the protesters refused to cease the
demonstrations. 273 This exemplifies how the PRC will use all means
necessary to neutralize perceived threats without paying much heed to its
international reputation. In situations that are perceived to be nonthreatening to CCP rule, it is much more likely that the PRC is influenced
by international pressure.
B. China's Shifting Values
The traditional Chinese value of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other states has given way to a more nuanced and pragmatic
approach. As described in Part III, the PRC regularly abstained from
voting in the Security Council during the 1970s and 1980s. The PRC
refused to contribute, financially and physically, to peacekeeping
missions due to its strict adherence to state sovereignty. However, today
we see a much different dynamic within the Security Council. China
contributes more troops to peacekeeping missions than any other P5
member. The PRC no longer categorically abstains from voting and
analyzes each conflict on a case-by-case basis. Chinese values are not
remaining static over time, but scholars are conflicted over how exactly
they are changing.
Some scholars have classified China's.active engagement within the
United Nations as a reflection of the convergence of Chinese values to
Western values as defined in Part II. This conclusion is often based upon
China's rapid modernization and desire for continued economic growth.
Specifically, the PRC understands that it must work within the capitalist
system to continue on its growth trajectory. 74 Therefore, China is
working within the Western order and conforming to the values of the
system as time goes on. 2 75 Other scholars proffer more generalized
271. SeeSHIRK,supranote 10, at 8.
272. See Larry M. Wortzel, The Tiananmen MassacreReappraised: Public Protest,Urban
Warfare, and the People's Liberation Army, in CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING
UNDER STRESS 55, 55 (Andrew Scobell & Larry M. Wortzel eds., 2005), available at http://www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB623.pdf.
273. See id.
274. See Ikenberry, supra note 253, at 32.
275. See id.; see also David Gosset, From Threat to Trust: China's Role in UN
Peacekeeping,WORLD POST (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-gosset/china-
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assumptions of Chinese values conformance with "the rules of the
international community," without any further elaboration on what those
values are. 276 This Article contends that those arguments are overgeneralized. Although there are some Western values that China has
seriously considered more than in previous decades, such as issues
relating to human rights and free markets, Chinese values are not
significantly converging toward Western values.
China is, however, undergoing a marked shift toward the values
underpinning the United Nations and the Security Council as expressed
in the founding U.N. documents. These values, described in Part II,
include the general prohibition for the use of force except as a last
resort, 2 77 the requirement of Security Council authorization for the use of
force, non-interference in domestic matters of states, and the promotion
of human rights. Traditional Chinese values have included noninterference in the internal matters of states for decades. But, it is a
different story for the other three foundational values of the United
Nations and the Security Council.
Chinese values are seemingly harmonizing with the values underlying
the United Nations and the Security Council. Because of the traditional
Chinese values of non-interference and a strict adherence to state
sovereignty, it makes sense that the PRC would resort to the use of force
only as a last resort. 278 Furthermore, the PRC's predominant focus is on
internal matters, namely the preservation of the Communist Party, and
therefore, will be less likely to focus attention on foreign intervention.2 79
The PRC also objects to the unilateral right of humanitarian
intervention 280 and instead requires Security Council authorization for the
use of force.2 8 '
In regard to the promotion of human rights, 282 the PRC has
increasingly supported peacekeeping missions as demonstrated by
China's increase in troop contributions. The PRC's questionable record
with human rights, as described in Part III, has not precluded it from
supporting peacekeeping missions throughout the world. Thus, the PRC's
initial refusal to fund peacekeeping missions in the 1970s and its current
status as the largest troop contributor of the P5 demonstrates that Chinese
us-relations b 1998484.html.
276. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 62, at 28.
277. This includes situations of self-defense and humanitarian intervention.
278.

See INTERNATIONAL CRisIs GROUP 2009, supranote 19, at 22.

279. See SHIRK, supra note 10, at 8.
280. See Davis, supra note 40, at 273.
281. See id. at 221; see also INTERNATIONAL CRISIs GROUP 2009, supra note 19, at 3. For
example, one of the reasons the PRC objected to NATO intervention in Kosovo was because the
mission lacked Security Council authorization. Davis, supra note 40, at 248.
282. This is also a Western value as described in Part II.
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values have begun to include human rights considerations. 283 Overall,
China's values appear to be aligning more with values underlying the
United Nations and the Security Council than with the values that
represent the Western order.
C. Implicationsfor PossibleAction in Syria
Syria is in a state of crisis. The current civil war between the Assad
regime and the rebel movement began in March 2011 when the first major
protests began in Damascus. 284 The Syrian government first deployed its
army in May 2011 in an attempt to quell anti-regime protesters. In
November 2011, the Arab League suspended Syria's membership
because of the Assad regime's violence against its own people. 285 Former
General Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, brokered a
ceasefire between the Assad regime and opposition groups in March 2012
in a six-point proposal.286 However, the violence continued and the
Security Council reacted by passing Resolution 2042, which authorized
the deployment
of unarmed observers to monitor the ceasefire in Syria
28 7
(UNSMIS).
In April 2012, the United Nations had to withdraw its personnel
because of the escalating violence.288 The opposition forces incorporated
into one formal body called the National Coalition for Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Force in November 2012, which has been
recognized by several states as the legitimate representative of the Syrian
people. 28 9 As of June 2013, the U.N. Human Rights Office estimated that
nearly 93,000 were killed in the civil war between March 2011 and April
2013.290 To add to the bleak situation in Syria, U.N. inspectors found
283.
284.

See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 33.
See Anup Kaphle, Timeline: Unrest in Syria, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2014), http://apps.

washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/timeline-unrest-in-syria/207/.
285. See Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria Over Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011 / 11/13/world/middleeast/arab-league-vote

s-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
286. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution
2042 (2012), Authorizing Advance Team to Monitor Ceasefire in Syria, U.N. Press Release
SC/10609 (Apr. 14, 2012).
287. See id.; see also S.C. Res. 2042, T 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042 (Apr. 14, 2012).
288. See THE CRISIS IN SYRIA, supra note 4; see also David Rieff, R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES

(Nov. 7,2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all.
289. See id. (the states include France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in
addition to the Arab League).
290. See Nearly 93, 000 PeopleKilled in 'Vicious'Syria Conflict- UN Human Rights Chief
U.N. NEWS CENTRE (June 13, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=45162#.
UzotmIdUI. A recent report issued by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights puts the death
toll at over 150,000 people. Syria: War Deaths Top 150,000, Human Rights Group Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/world/middleeast/syria-war-deaths-
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evidence of sarin gas used in a Syrian village and uncovered the
"Starvation Until Submission Campaign" in October 2013.291 Sarin gas
is twenty-six times more
deadly than cyanide gas and has been used only
2 92
a few times in history.
The difference of opinions among the P5 caused the Security Council
to initially take limited action against the violence. The PRC and Russia
have both vetoed three draft resolutions regarding the situation in
Syria.293 For example, the July 2012 draft resolution invoked Chapter VII
powers and called for the renewal of the UNSMIS, the implementation
of the six-point proposal discussed above, and threatened measures under
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter if Syria did not comply. 294 The PRC
decided to veto these resolutions, in part, because it believed the
295
resolutions would breach Syrian state sovereignty.
After a period of non-action, the Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 2118 in September 2013 as a response to the reports
that sarin gas was used against civilians. According to the current U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, Samantha Powers, "the United
States, all members of the Security Council and 98% of the world"
believed that the sarin gas must be eradicated.296 Pursuant to Resolution
2118, the Assad regime must destroy its stockpile of chemical
weapons.297 Furthermore, the resolution mandated the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee Syrian
compliance with the resolution and invoked measures under Chapter VII
if Syria fails to cooperate. 298 As of April 2014, the OPCW reported that
the Assad regime removed almost eighty-six percent of its chemical
weapon stockpile and remained in compliance with Resolution 2118.299
Nevertheless, the violence committed by the Assad regime remains
top-I 50000-human-rights-group-says.html.
291. SeeinfraPartl.

292.

Saddam Hussein used sarin gas in 1988, killing about 5000 Kurds. What is Sarin? A

Lethal Nerve Gas that Kills in Minutes, WORLD POST (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/09/01I/what-is-sarin_n_3853044.html.
293. See Veto List, supra note 61. These draft resolutions include S.C. Draft Res. 612, U.N.
Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011), S.C. Draft Res. 77, U.N. Doc. S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012), and
S.C. Draft Res. 538, U.N. Doc. S/2012/538 (July 19, 2012).

294. See S.C. Draft Res. 538, paras. 3, 10, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/538 (July 19, 2012).
295. See Chan, supra note 30, at 892.
296. See U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Remarks by Ambassador
Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the Security Council
Stakeout Following Consultations in Syria (Sept. 26, 2013), http://usun.state.gov/briefing/
statements/214832.htm.
297. See S.C. Res. 2118, 2-4, U.N. DOC. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013).
298. Seeid. 7,21.
299. Removal of Syrian Chemicals Passes 86% of Total, ORG. FOR THE PROHIBITION OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/removal-of-syrian-

chemicals-passes-86-of-total/.
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steady. 300 In regards to the regime's starvation campaign, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 2139 that demanded all fighting parties to
allow the delivery of humanitarian aid and allow civilians to move freely
about the country. 30 1 The resolution also expressed grave concern at the
rising amount of refugees fleeing Syria, totaling more than 2.4 million
people. 30 2 However, the resolution does not include language regarding
possible sanctions in case of noncompliance. 30 3 In July 2014, the Security
Council, by unanimous vote, authorized U.N. access to the
Syria-Iraq
30 4
border to deliver humanitarian aid without Syria's consent.
Possible Security Council action in Syria moving forward is
complicated to say the least, in part, due to China. The PRC originally
did not support three draft resolutions addressing the crisis in Syria. Some
scholars believe that the PRC's veto, along with the Russian veto, evinces
the PRC's displeasure with Libya. Specifically, the PRC expressed
serious concern over the regime change caused by NATO intervention in
Libya.30 5 Resolution 1970 and 1973 authorized action in Libya because
of R2P, but did not permit NATO air strikes to support the rebellion
against Qaddafi.3 °6 Thus, the PRC is wary of extending R2P to another
international conflict because of a slippery slope; namely, the potential
for R2P to be used as a cover for307regime change in other states with
oppressive regimes, such as Syria.
In perceived accordance with one of the factors proposed by this
Article, the PRC curiously changed its position after the bad press it
received after vetoing draft resolutions regarding Syria. 30 1 It is likely that
the PRC felt that the reputational cost of another veto would be too high
to withstand since the severe atrocities committed against the Syrian
people received near universal condemnation from the international
community. The PRC's support of Resolutions 2118 and 2139 attest to
this Article's argument that increasing international pressure to act will
300. See Salma Abdelaziz, Syrian Peace Talks Going Nowhere; Violence, Military Buildup
Resumes, CNN NEWS (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/14/world/meast/syria-peacetalks/.
301. See S.C. Res. 2139,
5-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2139 (Feb. 22, 2014).
302. See id.
303. See Russia, China Vote for UN HumanitarianResolution on Syria, AL JAZEERA (Feb.
22, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/22/syria-un-securitycouncil.html.
304. See S.C. Res. 2165, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2165 (July 14, 2014). Pursuant to Resolution
2165, U.N. convoys may enter Syria through two routes in Turkey that are beyond Syrian
government control.
305. See Rieff, supra note 288; see also Directorate-General for External Policies of the
Union, supra note 67, at 6.
306. See Rieff, supra note 288.
307. See Geoxavier, supra note 92, at 100.
308. See id. This Article has not incorporated recent Chinese support for Resolutions 2118
and 2139.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol27/iss1/5

40

Mastroianni: Growing Numbers of Chinese Blue Helmets: China's Changing Role Wi

GROWING NUMBERS OF CHINESE BLUE HELME7S." CHINA 'S CHANGING ROLE

make it more likely for the PRC to support sanctions regimes or
peacekeeping missions. The finding that sarin gas had been used on
civilians led to the unanimous passage of Resolution 2118. The blocking
of food and medicine to civilians in certain villages served as the impetus
for Resolution 2139. In essence, the high reputational cost the PRC would
have suffered from blocking either of these resolutions more than likely
influenced its decision to proffer its support.
It is too soon to tell what Security Council actions are possible in
Syria. It would depend upon continued Syrian compliance with
Resolution 2118 in destroying chemical weapon stockpiles and also
30 9
compliance with Resolution 2139. Most likely, the PRC and Russia
will remain opposed to any resolution invoking R2P because of the
regime change effected by it in Libya. However, if conditions worsen in
Syria, there may be room for further action as demonstrated by the high
reputational costs associated with blocking Resolutions 2118 and 2139 as
discussed above. The fact that the Arab League, the relevant regional
organization, condemns the high level of violence may also increase the
chances for future PRC support. Essentially, the forecast is bleak. The
conflict in Syria would have to worsen for the PRC to support future
Security Council action that has some real teeth.
One question remains to be answered by this Article: so what does
this all mean for the Security Council? Many people within the United
States are skeptical over China's rising great power status because of the
fear of the unknown. However, this Article demonstrates that the PRC is
not a loose cannon on the international scene. In fact, China is acting
rationally and will continue to act according to its self-interest within the
Security Council. Therefore, an understanding of the PRC's material
interests, as well as its underlying values, is necessary to garner Chinese
support for future sanctions regimes and peacekeeping operations. It is
certain, though, that the PRC has its own agenda and will not subjugate
its interests for the interests of other states. This is truly no different than
any other state in the international community.

309. Especially in light of the recent Russian invasion of Crimea which remains highly
controversial amongst the international community. See supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
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